Normally it has been found that an employer is looking for a good employee or an employee is looking for a good job as he is not satisfied from his current job. How should the most appropriate employers and job candidates find each other? It looks very difficult . Newly minted economists typically send applications to an average of 80 potential employers, and as a result, many employers receive hundreds of applications. It is extremely time-consuming to sort through all the applications, and as the process unfolds, there is a risk of coordination failure, in which employers and candidates who would be well-suited do not manage to create a match. In this paper, HBS professors Peter A. Coles and Alvin E. Roth and colleagues provide an overview of the market for new PhD economists and describe new mechanisms to improve the matching process. They conclude by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information, and other design issues that may arise in the market for new economists.
Mainly they include:
- Practical market design is often a response to particular problems. A new market design often leads the way to developing new knowledge. The new knowledge is the thing which can provide you the new ways.
- Two new mechanisms have facilitated matches. Good match can produce a good result. The first, a signaling service, allows job candidates to express interest to a limited number to potential employers prior to interviews at association meetings. The second mechanism, a web-based "scramble," reduces search costs and "thickens" the late part of the job market for candidates and employers still seeking a match. Many can get the match but many are in a position to get good and on the mean while they are relying on the current
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